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Abstract In this paper we use an error correction model for understanding the changes in
real office rents for a panel of 15 U.S. MSA’s over the period 1990-2007. We find that
office rents in all cities react positively to a rise in office employment and lagged rent
changes, while lagged deviations from equilibrium rent levels exhibit a slow and partial
adjustment over time. Given the non-negativity constraint of vacancy rates we extend the
basic model by examining whether rents react to positive changes in employment
conditional on the vacancy rate level. Our results show that office rents react significantly
stronger to increases in employment when vacancy rates are below the long-term average.
We also repeat the analysis for clusters of cities based on similarities in rent and
employment dynamics using multi dimensional scaling. The cluster results confirm the
overall conclusions and show that our results are not solely valid for the full panel of cities.
Keywords Office rents . Error correction model . Panel data
Introduction
In this study we show that the impact of increases in demand for office space on changes
in office rents depends on the disequilibrium in the demand-supply relationship. If
vacancy rates are below their long term average office rents react significantly stronger to
positive changes in office employment when compared to periods of abundant supply.
Understanding rent dynamics is key to both users and investors in office markets, markets
that have developed into a significant proportion of the overall economy. According to
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics office employment accounts for over 19% of non-
farm employment. This statistic represents a total of 26 million office based employees
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in the U.S. by the end of 2007. For metropolitan areas like San Francisco, Washington
DC and New York the weight of office employment can reach peaks of close to 30%.
Office rents are also a key input variable for construction decisions and to a large extent
determine the profitability of new office investments. Hence, a vast strand of academic
literature has developed over the years, which aims at cracking the DNA code of office
rents. In these models, rents are typically related to changes in employment, office supply
and vacancy levels. However, in almost all of these studies the authors assume that these
relationships are symmetric, and thus that changes in employment will have similar scale
effects irrespective of the level of the vacancy rate. Early studies by Wheaton (1987)
already showed that vacancy rates evolve around a natural rate, and that given the non-
negativity constraint vacancy rates tend to reach more distinctive peaks than troughs.
Therefore, an increase in office employment, when vacancy rates are low, is likely to
have a very different impact on rents, than when rates are high. Englund et al. (2008a)
are the first to include these asymmetric properties into their model calibration. They
explicitly studied asymmetric rent adjustments depending on the level of vacancy rates
when modeling Stockholm office rents for the period 1977–2002 and reported a
significant increase in the explanatory power of their rent models due to this inclusion.
This paper will add to the existing literature by applying an asymmetric rent
adjustment model to a unique panel set of quarterly data that covers fifteen metropolitan
areas (MSA’s) in the United States over the period 1990–2007. Measured by net
rentable area of office floor space these MSA’s are the largest in the U.S. and include
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Minneapolis,
New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Francisco and Washington DC. Besides a
panel that includes all MSA’s in one specification we also estimate the model based on
different clusters. We group MSA’s with multi dimensional scaling based on similarity
in rent- or employment dynamics and run panel data regressions based on these clusters.
The clustering methodology benefits from an increase in the number of observations
when compared to analysis on a MSA level while keeping the in-group homogeneity as
large as possible. Our results show that changes in office employment have a larger
impact on office rents when vacancy rates are below their long term average. This
finding implies for office investments that new demand does not influence rent rates in a
symmetric way but is most influential when prevailing vacancy rates are relatively low.
We also show that the coefficients are similar in sign and magnitude across clusters.
The paper continues as follows. After discussing the office market literature that
is most relevant for our research, we discuss the rent adjustment model that will be
applied in the subsequent analysis. Before discussing our results, we first present our
dataset and review the main attributes of the markets that are included in our sample.
In our results we explicitly compare results that were yielded from competitive
model specifications; models with and without asymmetric properties. Besides
discussing pooled panel results we also look at results, for clusters of cities. The
main results will be summarized in our conclusions.
Modeling Office Rent Adjustments
The earliest office literature focused on vacancy rates and typically modelled office
rent dynamics as a function of deviations from the natural vacancy rate that is
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required to clear the market. Wheaton and Torto (1988) use U.S. national time series
data on office rent levels and vacancy rates and find that excess vacancy rates affect
real rents, while the natural vacancy rate is influenced by variables such as the local
tenant structure, average lease terms in the market, expected absorption rates and
operating costs. The main problem with this specification is the assumption that
office rents keep on decreasing as long as the prevailing vacancy rate is above the
perceived natural rate which does not fit actual relationships. Hendershott (1996), in
a study of the Sydney office market, introduced a more general rent adjustment
model in which changes in real rents are a function of vacancy and rent deviations
from equilibrium levels. Equation 1 shows the basic form of this type of real estate
rent modelling.
%ΔRt ¼ a vt  vt1
 þ b Rt  Rt1
  ð1Þ
Where vt
* is the estimated natural vacancy rate and Rt
* is the time-varying
equilibrium real office rent. This model offers a more general adjustment path for
office rents with pleasing long-run properties, as effective rents are specified as
adjustments to gaps between both the natural and actual vacancy rates and
equilibrium and actual gross rents. With this equation, vacancy rates do not have
to overshoot following a supply shock. After high vacancy rates have dragged rents
significantly below equilibrium, the known eventual return to equilibrium acts as a
force causing real rents to rise, even when the vacancy rate is still above the natural
rate. This model is estimated by Hendershott et al. (1999) using data from the City of
London for the period 1977-1996 and shows that the model tracks the market
dynamics.
Hendershott et al. (2002) and Hendershott et al. (2002) extend these rent
adjustment models by deriving a model that incorporates supply and demand factors
within an Error Correction Model (ECM). This model is derived as a reduced-form
estimation equation for the occupied office space and has the benefit that it does not
require estimates for variables such as depreciation rates and operating expenses as is
shown in Hendershott et al. (2002) where both a rent adjustment equation in line
with Eq. 1 and an error correction model are estimated. Demand for space (D) is
modelled as a function of real effective rent (R) and a proxy for office employment
(E)1:
D ¼l0 Rl1El2 ð2Þ
Where the λi’s are constants with the price elasticity, λ1, expected to be negative
and λ2, the income elasticity, positive. Demand for office space, a function of R and
E as in Eq. 2, equals the product of available office space (SU) and one minus the
prevailing office vacancy rate (v):
D R;Eð Þ ¼ 1 vð ÞSU ð3Þ
Given the fact that real estate markets clear towards equilibrium through changes
in rents and vacancy levels (as shown in Eq. 3), vacancy enters the error correction
model as a fitted variable indicated as bv in order to prevent endogeneity problems.
1 In the data section we elaborate on the definition of office related employment.
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The procedure we use to model vacancy levels is in line with Hendershott et al.
(2002) and consists of an AR(4) model based on quarterly observations. Adjusted R2
for the ten cities included in our analysis of the AR(4) model over the period 1990–
2006 range from 0.93 to 0.95. Rearranging Eqs. (2) and (3) by logarithmic
transformation, including fitted vacancy levels, and extracting real rent levels results
in Eq. (4).
lnRi;t ¼ g0 þ g1 lnEi;t þ g2 ln b 1 bvi;t
 
SUi:tc þ ui;t ð4Þ
Where the subscripts i and t denote individual MSA’s and quarters respectively.
The ECM which is used to model changes in real prime rents in a panel data
approach estimates long run equilibrium relationships and short-term corrections.
Due to frictions, as already indicated by Wheaton (1987) in a study of the cyclic
behaviour of the U.S. office market, office markets usually do not clear within short-
run periods of time. We measure this imbalance as the residual of Eq. 4 and
subsequently introduce this variable as a factor in the short-run model. The rationale
for including the residual in the rent adjustment model is the delay in restoration of
equilibriums in real estate markets due to factors such as long term contracts and
high search costs. Equation 5 shows the disequilibrium.
ui;t ¼ lnRi;t  g0  g1 lnEi;t  g2 lnb 1 bvi;t
 
SUi:tc ð5Þ
Inclusion of the dependent variable in Eq. 5 in the rent adjustment model is
possible if the variable is stationary which is equal to the independent variables
being cointegrated. Since we base our model on panel data we apply the Levin et al.
(2002) panel unit root test.2
Taking log differences of Eq. 4 and adding the stationary residual from Eq. 5
leads to the short-run rent adjustment model as depicted in Eq. 6 with an added
lagged dependent variable to include the autoregression present in the change in real
rent series.3
Δ lnRi;t ¼ a0 þ a1Δ lnEi;t þ a2Δ ln 1bvi;t
 
SUi;t
 þ a3ui;t1
þ a4Δ ln Ri;t1 þ "i;t ð6Þ
According to Eq. (6) office rents react to short-run changes in causal variables and
to lagged residuals of the long-run model, as a reflection of market imbalances.4 The
immediate responses to employment shocks and changes in occupied space are
given by the coefficients α1 and α2.
We use an extended version of Eq. 6 to capture the asymmetry in office rent
adjustments. By including an interaction term between changes in lnEt and a dummy
variable, that takes value 1 if the vacancy rate is below the MSA long term average
2 Tests for the presence of a unit root in the regression error terms shows that all residuals used in our
study are stationary.
3 A regression of rent changes on rent changes lagged one period result in a coefficient of 0.32 which is
significant at the 1% level.
4 Modelling results are expected to indicate that α0 equals zero, α1, α2, α3 and α5 are positive, while, α4 is
expected to display a negative sign. α3 indicates the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium. If α3 equals
−1 there is full equilibrium restoration after one period while α3 between zero and −1 or larger than −1
indicate partial- and over- adjustment respectively.
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vacancy rate and the change in office employment positive, and 0 otherwise, we test
the hypothesis that office rents react stronger to changes in office employment when
the market is tight. This results in the following rent adjustment equation:
Δ lnRi;t ¼ a0 þ a1Δ lnEi;t þ a2Δ lnb 1bvi;t
 
SUi;tc þ a3ui;t1
þ a4Δ lnRi;t1 þ a5 Δ lnEþi;t
 
VR dummyi;t þ "i;t ð7Þ
Figure 1 shows for each MSA when the prevailing vacancy rate was above or
below the local long term average vacancy rate. Our hypothesis is that the impact of
office employment changes on rents is higher when vacancy rates are low when
compared to a less tense office market.
We estimate and evaluate models (6) and (7) to test the effects of including the
asymmetric properties based on our panel data of fifteen MSA’s over 69 quarters,
resulting in a sample of 1035 observations. So far the office literature has been
dominated by papers focusing on explaining the rent dynamics of one single office
market. Examples are London by Wheaton, Torto and Evans (1997a), Hendershott et
al. (1999), and Farelly and Sanderson Farrelly and Sanderson (2005), Stockholm by
Gunnelin and Söderberg (2003), Englund et al. (2008a, b), Sydney by Hendershott
(1996), San Francisco by Rosen (1984), Hong Kong by Hui and Yu (2006), Dublin
by D’Arcy et al. (1999), and Boston by McClure (1991).
Few studies exist that analyze multiple markets. D’Arcy et al. (1997) examine 22
European cities and use pooled analysis with city dummies based on size of office stock,
growth of real GDP and growth in service sector employment. Giussani et al. (1992)
estimate rent models for ten European cities. Different demand side variables are tested
in a pooled regression and for the individual cities. They find that coefficients are
comparable in sign and magnitude across cities. Hendershott et al. (2002) estimate panel
data error correction models for retail and office property rents for eleven regions in the
U.K. covering 29 years. They estimate separate regional models and combine regions in
panels based on communality in income and price elasticities. The main finding is that,
while economic divers can vary between regions, that there is no evidence of differences
in the operation of the regional property markets outside London. De Wit and van Dijk
(2003) test rent models for static and dynamic panels for 46 office district across Asia,
Europe and the U.S. and up to 56 quarterly observations per district.
Data
The data set in this study consists of quarterly, MSA level, real estate and
employment data covering the period 1990-2007. Torto Wheaton Research (TWR) is
the source of our real estate data which combines an extensive geographical
coverage with a broad set of relevant real estate data. For the 15 largest office
markets in the U.S. we have data on office completions, net absorption of office
space, the net rentable area of office space in the MSA, office market vacancy rates
and the TWR office rent index.5 Data on office completions reflects the square
5 The data gathering and compilation methodology of TWR has been discussed in detail in Wheaton et al.
(1997b).
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Fig. 1 Vacancy rates and MSA average vacancy rates. This figure shows the quarterly vacancy rate (VR)
on a MSA level and the local average vacancy rate (AV_VR) over the study period 1990-2007
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footage of office space completed each period or new space under construction due
to completion in near future. The figure on net absorption reflects the net change in
competitively leased space per period in square feet. The square footage is the
amount of new space being brought into a market over a period of time, minus the
change in vacant space over that same time period. Net rentable area data contain all
office buildings whose size exceeds for most markets 20,000 or 30,000 square feet
and results from information gathered by local CB Commercial offices throughout
the United States. Information on office market vacancy rates is the result of an
extensive survey by CB Commercial, which covers the vast majority of
competitively rented buildings.
Different forms of office rent indices have been applied in extant literature.
Private companies that provide the data apply different methodologies when
constructing indices and face the problem of determining the true rent paid on a
contract. This problem is caused by the incentive that property owners and tenants
have not to disclose rent rates as this would limit future negotiation bandwidths.
Furthermore, property owners offer all kinds of incentives in cash and kind to attract
potential tenants. As the value of the incentives is positively related to the prevalent
vacancy rate there is no fixed adjustment possible over time. McDonald (2002)
discusses five different measures of rent per square foot that have been employed in
empirical office market research and ranks the different rent indices in increasing
accuracy as follows: [ I ] asking rent (gross and net), [ II ] face rent on new leases
(gross and net), [ III ] consideration rent averaged over the term of the lease (rent
levels are adjusted for broker commission and months of free rent but both on gross
and net basis) [ IV ] consideration rent index (corrected for building and contract
details) and [ V ] effective net rent that measures the net present value of cash flows
over the term of the lease. The TWR office rent index that we use in our study is of
type [ IV ] and is based on information contained in CB Commercial deals.
Sivitanides (1997) and Mourouzi-Sivitanidou (2002) are examples of papers that use
data by the same provider which is based on hedonic methodology as employed by
Wheaton and Torto (1994) and Webb and Fisher (1996). Englund et al. (2008b)
create a similar hedonic rent index for Stockholm for the period 1972-2002.
Being at the heart of the negotiations and deals provides CB Commercial with a
broad set of contract and building details that subsequently enter the office rent index
in the form of control variables. The basic rent specification equation is as follows:
logðRÞ ¼ a0 þ a1SQFT þ a2TERM þ a3HIGH þ a4NEW þ a5GROSS
þ
X
biDi
1993
i¼1979
þ30
X
djSj
30
j¼1
; ð8Þ
where;
R total consideration rent per square foot per year
SQFT square feet of lease
TERM length of the lease in years
HIGH dummy variable (1 for 5 + stories, 0 otherwise)
NEW dummy variable (1 for new building, 0 otherwise)
GROSS dummy variable (1 for gross rent, 0 otherwise)
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Di dummy variable for each period
Sj dummy variable for up to 30 submarkets in MSA
The TWR rent index which is used in this study exhibits the rent for a five year,
10,000 ft gross rent lease in an existing building which is located in an average area
in the MSA. The rent modeling presented in this study is based on real, instead of
the reported nominal, rent levels. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics provides
consumer price indices (CPI) on a detailed MSA level which we use to adjust the
nominal rent indices. The MSA level CPI is constructed with the first quarter of
1987 as base level, therefore all reported real rent levels are in Q1 1987 dollar
values.
Our model of office rent changes builds upon changes in real estate variables and
an office space demand factor. In line with existing literature we measure demand for
office space as the number of people employed in office occupying industries. We
gather employment data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics which provides a
detailed overview of MSA level employment for a broad range of industry
classifications. The definition of what employment sectors constitute office demand
is not uniform across studies of office market dynamics. An extensive literature
study of measures of office employment shows that most studies use employment in
finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE), and service industries as a proxy for office
employment. This type of office employment definition is used by for example
Hekman (1985), Wheaton (1987), Wheaton et al. (1997b), Sivitanides (1997),
Sivitanides (1998), Shilton (1998) Hendershott et al. (1999), Mourouzi-Sivitanidou
(2002)6, Hendershott et al. (2002), Farrelly and Sanderson (2005), and Englund et al.
(2008a, b). Other studies use a narrower approximation of office employment which
only includes FIRE industries (see for example Rosen (1984), Hui and Yu (2006)
and Pollakowski et al. (1992). Modeling office rents for small geographic areas such
as financial heart of London (a.k.a. “The City”) or the financial district of Manhattan
is probably well approximated with the narrower definition of office employment.
However, for broader geographic areas, such as the MSA’s we use in this study, we
propose the broader measure such as employed in the majority of office rent studies.
Figure 2 provides an overview of the industries that make up office employment
according to the definition we use in this study.
The weight of professional and business service employment in total office
employment, measured as the sum of FIRE and service sector employment, is on
average 0.67 for all 15 MSA’s. The weight ranges between 0.58 for New York, a
MSA with a strong financial and thus FIRE employment base, and 0.77 for
Washington DC where services play a relatively large role. The service component
of office employment increased for all MSA’s over the study period. The average
change in FIRE employment is 21% between 1990 and 2007 (−8% in New York, up
to 54% in Denver) while the average change in professional and business services is
54% (18% in Pittsburgh and 120% in Dallas). The average change across MSA’s in
total office employment over our study period is 42%.
One potential problem with the office employment data is the strong seasonal
component in the “administration and support and waste management and
6 She includes the ratio of FIRE to other office employment to take account on the idea that FIRE
employment takes more square feet per employee.
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remediation services” industry which works through to the overall office
employment figure. In a perfect market companies would adjust their demand for
space on a frequent basis; thereby minimizing rent costs. However, companies
cannot adjust their space demand continuously due to moving costs, search time and
long-term contracts. For this reason we expect companies to maximize their utility
by renting floor space that lies somewhere between the maximum and minimum
requirement to house all employees over contract duration. To overcome the impact
of seasonality on our demand variable we use a four quarter moving average
measure for the industry with high seasonal changes.7
Table 1 shows the correlation between changes in office employment for the
whole country, the weighted average of MSA’s included in this study8, and the
individual MSA’s.. The average correlation of changes in employment across all
MSA’s is 0.48; reflecting strong differences in employment growth or composition
across the sample. The table shows that the Atlanta, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles
and Pittsburgh are the MSA’s with on average the lowest correlation with other
markets and that these are the only MSA’s that exhibit statistically non-significant
correlations.
Office
Employment
Financial Activities Professional and Business Services
Finance and 
Insurance
Real Estate and 
Rental and Leasing
Credit intermediation 
and 
Related Activities
Insurance Carriers 
and 
Related Activities
Real Estate
Professional, 
Scientific 
and Technical 
Services
Management of 
Companies 
and Enterprises
Admin., Support 
and Waste Mgt. 
and Remediation 
Services
Architectural, 
Engineering 
and Related Services
Computer Systems 
Design 
and Related Services
Administrative and 
Support Services
Employment 
Services
Investigation and 
Security Services
Services to Buildings 
and Dwellings
Fig. 2 Office employment make-up. This figure shows the composition of office employment. Office
employment is defined as number of employees occupied in financial activities and professional and
business services. Moving down through the figure each line combines the upper industry with the sub-
industries it is composed of
7 We also tried the U.S. Statistics Bureau X12 procedure to delete the seasonality, but despite its
theoretical superiority, peaks and troughs remain which does not fit demand for real estate assets.
8 Where weights are based on the number of people employed in office occupying industries.
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Table 2 provides an overview of summary statistics of office data for the 15
MSA’s covered in this study. New York is by far the largest office market at the end
of 2006 with a total square footage of over 400 million; over 60% larger than the
second in line, Los Angeles and more than 6.5 times the size of Minneapolis which
is the smallest office market covered in this study. Average real rents in 1987
constant dollars range between $9.7 in Houston and $24.4 in New York. Summary
statistics for the vacancy rate show that all cities, when examining the mean over the
study period, report double digit vacancy rates. Vacancy rates over the study period
range between 1.7%, in San Francisco near the end of the Dotcom boom, to 30.3%
in Houston towards the end of the 1980’s.
Figure 3 displays the time series of vacancy rates; real rent levels and the number
of employees in office occupying industries over the period 1990-2007. The Figure
shows that the vacancy rate for all MSA’s over the study period is often a close
mirror image of real rent index despite the disturbing influence of new construction
and hidden vacancy rates, as discussed in Englund et al. (2008b). Vacancy rates
show similar patterns across all MSA’s and are characterized by high but steady
levels over the years 1988-1994, which was a period characterized by a downturn in
the U.S. economy partly due to the collapse of the junk bond market and a credit
crunch. Over the whole, vacancy rates decreased over the period 1995-1998
preceding a period of low vacancy rates during the economic boom period 1998-
2000. The latter period clearly shows the non-negativity constraint of vacancy rates
as vacancies reached their local minima during the years 1998–2000, triggering new
construction and the lowest space usage per employee over the study period as
shown in Fig. 4.9
After the turn of the millennium the U.S. economy hit hard times with the crash of
the Dotcom bubble and the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington DC.
The combination of ongoing new supply and decreasing employment at office
occupying companies in all 15 MSA’s lead to a steep increase in vacancy rates over
the period 2000–2003.
Real rent levels show similar patterns across MSA’s over time. Rent expressed in
constant 1987 dollars show large dispersion across cities. In the first quarter of 2000
real rent levels were as low as $11.29 in Houston, which alternates with Denver for
the lowest rent per square foot and as high as $28.51 in New York, where renting
office space was most expensive over the whole study period. The discrepancy
between the highest and lowest rent values is fairly consistent over time. On average
the highest rent is 2.64 times the lowest rent over all quarters with a range of 2.1 to
3.6 over the study period.
Empirical Results
This section presents the results for the two stage error correction model for changes
in real office rents. One of the contributions of this study is the addition of a test of
asymmetry in rent response to positive changes in office employment. Therefore we
9 We measure space usage per employee in square feet as: (net rentable area*(1-vacancy rate))/office
employment).
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics
MSA Mean Min. Year / Quarter Min Max Year / Quarter Max
Panel A
Atlanta 97,534 65,299 88Q1 126,691 07Q1
Boston 134,036 110,054 88Q1 154,920 07Q1
Chicago 193,125 160,835 88Q1 218,883 07Q1
Dallas 119,491 107,327 88Q1 139,324 07Q1
Denver 72,428 64,437 88Q1 85,372 07Q1
Detroit 62,018 50,664 88Q1 70,391 07Q1
Houston 127,040 121,447 88Q1 137,171 07Q1
Los Angeles 159,395 129,121 88Q1 173,390 07Q1
Minneapolis 57,723 47,998 88Q1 65,113 06Q4
New York 418,706 397,501 88Q1 427,568 07Q1
Philadelphia 87,196 68,891 88Q1 100,200 07Q1
Pittsburgh 59,027 53,050 88Q1 65,274 06Q4
San Francisco 73,119 63,071 88Q1 83,542 07Q1
Seattle 61,192 43,793 88Q1 75,599 07Q1
Washington, DC 211,601 159,481 88Q1 262,044 07Q1
All 128,909 43,793 427,568
Panel B
Atlanta 11.6 10.0 93Q2 13.1 88Q2
Boston 17.0 12.8 92Q4 27.0 00Q4
Chicago 15.2 12.9 05Q3 18.3 88Q2
Dallas 11.0 9.1 93Q4 14.6 98Q4
Denver 9.8 8.2 91Q4 12.8 00Q2
Detroit 11.0 9.1 07Q1 14.1 88Q4
Houston 9.7 8.3 93Q4 11.6 00Q3
Los Angeles 13.6 11.3 95Q1 17.0 88Q1
Minneapolis 14.5 11.7 92Q4 18.3 88Q2
New York 24.4 18.3 93Q4 34.6 01Q1
Philadelphia 12.5 10.2 06Q3 16.2 89Q4
Pittsburgh 11.7 9.6 06Q3 13.1 00Q2
San Francisco 14.1 10.9 05Q1 23.1 00Q2
Seattle 14.3 12.2 04Q4 18.6 98Q4
Washington, DC 17.8 14.5 93Q2 23.5 00Q4
All 13.9 8.2 34.6
Panel C
Atlanta 16.0% 8.7% 96Q2 22.3% 04Q1
Boston 12.1% 3.3% 00Q2 18.2% 91Q3
Chicago 15.0% 8.1% 00Q2 19.2% 93Q3
Dallas 22.5% 14.1% 97Q4 28.3% 88Q2
Denver 16.0% 7.4% 98Q3 27.3% 88Q1
Detroit 15.8% 7.8% 98Q4 21.3% 04Q1
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estimate both a symmetric and an asymmetric model specification, based on Eqs. 6
and 7 respectively. Table 3 displays the results for the full panel including all 15
MSA’s. The top panel displays the results for the long run model. We base this
model on non-differenced data and use it to calculate the prevailing rent
disequilibrium.
The long run model does not differ between the symmetric and asymmetric model
as it is merely used to determine the equilibrium rent level. Our regression results
show that the long run model has an adjusted R-squared of approximately 0.80 with
a Durbin Watson coefficient considerably below unity. The coefficients and model fit
estimates from the long run model are comparable to the findings for European
office markets as reported in Hendershott et al. (2002) and Brounen and Jennen
(2009), and are a direct result of the trending variables used in the long-run model.
The bottom panel in Table 3 shows the result for the differenced rent model. In
the symmetric model specification we show that rents react positively to changes in
office employment and lagged changes in office rents. The coefficient for the error
correction term is between zero and minus one which indicates a partial adjustment
towards equilibrium over one quarter periods. The magnitude of this estimate is
however very small, pointing at very slow adjustment over time.10 The measure for
occupied space shows an unexpected positive sign which is however only significant
at the 5% level. The second short run model specification presented in Table 3 shows
the result for the asymmetric model. Coefficients in the asymmetric model are
similar to the results in the symmetric model in both sign and statistical significance,
but with an even lower statistical significance for the occupied space variable. The
Table 2 (continued)
MSA Mean Min. Year / Quarter Min Max Year / Quarter Max
Houston 19.0% 11.2% 98Q3 30.3% 88Q1
Los Angeles 16.5% 9.7% 07Q1 21.6% 93Q2
Minneapolis 14.1% 4.7% 98Q3 21.9% 88Q3
New York 11.5% 3.3% 00Q2 17.9% 91Q2
Philadelphia 14.3% 9.0% 00Q3 18.0% 91Q1
Pittsburgh 14.7% 10.3% 97Q2 19.3% 04Q4
San Francisco 11.8% 1.7% 00Q1 20.8% 03Q2
Seattle 11.3% 2.5% 00Q2 17.2% 89Q2
Washington, DC 10.6% 3.9% 00Q4 17.4% 91Q2
All 14.7% 1.7% 30.3%
This table shows descriptive office market statistics for 15 U.S. MSA’s over the period 1988 till the first
quarter of 2007. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for net rentable area which is the sum of rentable
floor space of all office buildings in the MSA. Figures are in ‘000s of square feet. Panel B shows summary
statistics of Torto Wheaton Research real rent (in 1987.1 constant dollars) per square foot. Panel C shows
summary statistics for the vacancy rate
10 The error correction term is −0.008 in the symmetric model for the whole panel. This number implies
that over the course of one year only 3.23% of the disequilibrium in rents is restored.
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Fig. 3 Office market dynamics. This figure shows the dynamics in vacancy rate (VR, left axis in %), the
Torto Wheaton Research office rent index in real terms (Real_rent, left axis in constant 1987.1 dollars) in
$ per square foot and office employment (OE, right axis in ‘000s employees) for all 15 MSA’s covered in
this study
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Fig. 4 Occupied office space per office employee. This figure shows vacancy rate dynamics (VR, left
axis in %) and the office space usage per employee (FT2_per_employee, left axis in ft 2 per employee)
calculated as [(1-VR) * net rentable floor space]/office employment
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Table 3 Regression results (all cities)
All City Panel
Symmetric Model Asymmetric Model
Long-run model
Constant 8.559 *** 8.559 ***
(0.968) (0.968)
ln (Et) 1.292 *** 1.292 ***
(0.095) (0.095)
ln [(1−v^t)SUt] −1.225 *** −1.225 ***
(0.132) (0.132)
N 990 990
R2-adj 0.799 0.799
DW 0.060 0.060
Short-run model
Constant −0.002 *** −0.003 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Δ ln (Et) 2.499 *** 1.503 ***
(0.272) (0.314)
Δ ln [(1−v^t)SUt] 0.584 ** 0.156 *
(0.279) (0.275)
u t-1 −0.008 *** −0.015 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
Δ ln R t-1 −0.419 *** 0.399 ***
(0.030) (0.029)
[Δ ln E + t] * VR_DUMMYt — 2.406 ***
(0.401)
N 975 975
R2-adj 0.399 0.421
DW 1.913 1.918
This table reports the error correction model of office rents for a panel of 15 MSA’s included in the study
based on quarterly observations over the period 1990–2007. The long-run model lnRt = α0 + α1lnEt +
α2ln[1-v^t ]SUt is estimated as a cross sectional fixed effect model. The dependent variable is real office
rent in 1987.1 constant U.S. dollars. We estimate office employment (Et) as the sum of employment in
finance, insurance, real estate, professional- and business services. [1−v^t]SUt is an estimate for occupied
space, where v^ is the fitted vacancy rate based on an AR(4) model and SU is the supply of office space in
square feet. The results include the symmetric and asymmetric models which differ in the short-run model
only. The symmetric short-run model ∆lnRt = α0 + α1∆lnEt + α2∆ln[1−v^t ]SUt t + α3ut−1 + α4∆lnRt−1 is
estimated as a cross sectional fixed effect model. Δ measures the one period change in variables. ut−1 is
the one period lagged residual of the long-run model. ∆lnRt−1 is the one period lagged change in real
prime rents. The asymmetric short-run model ∆lnRt = α0 + α1∆lnEt + α2∆ln[1−v^t ]SUt + α3ut−1 +
α4∆lnRt−1 + α5[∆lnE + t]VR_DUMMYt is estimated as a cross sectional fixed effect model. [∆lnE + t]
reflects positive one period changes in office employment and takes value zero is the change in
employment is negative. VR_DUMMYt is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the vacancy rate in time t
is below the MSA average vacancy rate, and 0 otherwise. DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic. Standard error
statistics appear in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
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positive and significant coefficient for the asymmetry variable shows that rents react
significantly stronger to positive changes in office employment when vacancy rates
are below the long term average, when compared to times of abundant vacant space.
This finding is in line with expectations. If vacancy rates are high, new demand for
space will first alleviate the owners of non-income producing vacant space before a
clear effect on office rents is visible. When vacancy rates are low the effect of
additional demand for office space as a result of an increase in office employment is
more directly related to office rents. However, including this asymmetric element in
the model enhances the fit of the model only marginally.
Cluster Analysis
The panel results presented in Table 3 assume that the coefficients for the
independent variables are equal across all MSA’s. In order to relax this assumption
we create panels based on similarity in the pattern of rent and office employment
changes over the sample period. In this way we are able to maintain the benefit of
large sample sizes, examine clusters with maximum between cluster heterogeneity,
while keeping the within sample homogeneity as large as possible. Hendershott et al.
(2002) is the only other known study that groups regions based on some similarity.
Their paper studies rent changes for a range of regions and estimates separate models
for “London” and “Other” regions in the UK for 11 regions and 29 years. Clusters in
the Hendershott et al. (2002) paper are based on similarities of the income and price
elasticities in the long run models. In this study we use an alternative methodology
in which we use multi dimensional scaling (MDS) and subsequent hierarchical
clustering analysis to group MSA in two clusters based on similarities in changes in
rent and office employment over time. MDS is a powerful tool for visualizing
correlations between pairs of cities or other instances (see for example Groenen and
Franses (2000) for an application in stock market correlation analysis). MDS creates
points in a low dimensional space where each dot reflects for example a city.
Clusters of cities appear if dots in the low dimensional space appear close to each
other in the output. The benefit over more traditional correlation analysis is the way
MDS shows not only the similarity between individual pairs of instances but also the
way in which all other observations are related. Besides the visual application, MDS
output also includes common space coordinates which forms the input for the
geographic representation of similarities. The common space coordinates form the
input for hierarchical clustering analysis; the foundation for the actual cluster
formation. We test different dimensional settings for the MDS and found, according
to the guidelines by Kruskal (1964), that the use of three dimensions is optimal in
our study. Our clusters based on communalities in rent and office employment
changes over the study period are shown in Fig. 4. Panels A and B show the clusters
based on rent and employment changes, respectively. Based on real rent changes we
form two clusters. One cluster consists of Boston, New York and San Francisco
(further indicated as cluster A2) and the other cluster encompasses all other MSA’s
(cluster A1).
If we base the clusters on office employment changes, Fig. 5 shows that three
main clusters arise. One cluster consists of Atlanta and Detroit (cluster B3), a second
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cluster includes New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburg, Los Angeles and Washington
DC (cluster B2) and the third cluster consists of the remaining MSA’s (cluster B1).11
Panel A1 in Table 4 shows the results for cluster A1. Coefficients and signs are
comparable to the findings presented in Table 3 with a model fit that is slightly lower
than the result for a panel including all MSA’s. The error correction term shows that
rent very slowly adjust towards equilibrium over the term of one quarter; a finding
shared with all other model specifications presented in this study. Results of the short
run model show that the impact of changes in our estimate of occupied space is not
statistically different from zero. Again, we show that the rent adjustment as a result
Fig. 5 Hierarchical clusters. This figure shows the dendrogram which results after a hierarchical
clustering analysis based on three dimensional common space coordinates. Common space coordinates are
constructed with multi dimensional scaling. Panel A shows clusters based on changes in office rents and
Panel B shows clusters based on changes in office employment
11 One interesting finding from this clustering methodology based on similarities in office rent or
employment changes is that clusters are not in line with geographic locations of the MSA’s. Further
analysis could provide more insight into the driving forces behind the correlations; possible causes are
similarities in local GDP drivers or employment composition.
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Table 4 Regression results for clusters based on communality in office rent changes
Panel A1 Panel A2
Symmetric
Model
Asymmetric
Model
Symmetric
Model
Asymmetric
Model
Long-run model
Constant 6.238 *** 6.238 *** 13.566 *** 13.566 ***
(0.915) (0.915) (2.725) (2.725)
ln (Et) 0.896 *** 0.896 *** 3.071 *** 3.071 ***
(0.091) (0.091) (0.255) (0.255)
ln [(1−v^t)SUt] −0.812 *** −0.812 *** −2.625 *** −2.625 ***
(0.126) (0.126) (0.352) (0.352)
N 792 792 198 198
R2-adj 0.752 0.752 0.784 0.784
DW 0.055 0.055 0.119 0.119
Short-run model
Constant −0.002 *** −0.003 *** −0.002 *** −0.003 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Δ ln (Et) 2.121 *** 0.774 ** 3.897 *** 3.139 ***
(0.293) (0.345) (0.678) (0.771)
Δ ln [(1−v^t)SUt] 0.456 0.413 0.901 0.886
(0.307) (0.298) (0.651) (0.645)
u t−1 −0.009 *** −0.021 *** −0.012 ** −0.015 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Δ ln R t-1 −0.400 *** 0.362 *** 0.415 *** 0.411 ***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.068) (0.067)
[Δ ln E + t] * VR_DUMMYt — 2.962 *** — 2.314 **
(0.429) (1.153)
N 780 780 195 195
R2-adj 0.333 0.372 0.543 0.550
DW 1.897 1.907 1.936 1.944
This table reports the error correction model of office rents for a panel of 15MSA’s included in the study based on
quarterly observations over the period 1990–2007. The sample is split in two Panels based on communality in
office rent changes. The long-run model lnRt = α0 + α1lnEt + α2ln[1−v^t ]SUt is estimated as a cross sectional
fixed effect model. The dependent variable is real office rent in 1987.1 constant U.S. dollars. We estimate office
employment (Et) as the sum of employment in finance, insurance, real estate, professional- and business
services. [1−v^t]SUt is an estimate for occupied space, where v^t is the fitted vacancy rate based on an AR(4)
model and SUt is the supply of office space in square feet. The results include the symmetric and asymmetric
models which differ in the short-run model only. The symmetric short-run model ∆lnRt = α0 + α1∆lnEt + α2∆ln
[1−v^t ]SUt t + α3ut−1 + α4∆lnRt−1 is estimated as a cross sectional fixed effect model. Δ measures the one
period change in variables. ut−1 is the one period lagged residual of the long-run model. ∆lnRt−1 is the one
period lagged change in real prime rents. The asymmetric short-runmodel∆lnRt = α0 + α1∆lnEt + α2∆ln[1−v^t ]
SUt + α3ut−1 α4∆lnRt−1 + α5[∆lnE + t]VR_DUMMYt is estimated as a cross sectional fixed effect model.
[∆lnE + t] reflects positive one period changes in office employment and takes value zero is the change in
employment is negative. VR_DUMMYt is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the vacancy rate in time t is
below the MSA average vacancy rate, and 0 otherwise. DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic. Standard error
statistics appear in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
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of an increase in office employment, the asymmetric model specification, is stronger
when vacancy rates are below their long term averages. The results for the remaining
MSA’s, as presented under Panel A2 in Table 4, are largely comparable in sign and
magnitude with a strong increase in model fit when compared to the panel of all
MSA and panel A1.
Table 5 shows the results for the clusters based on communalities in changes in
office employment across MSA’s. Panels B1 and B2 are comparable to the results
presented in Tables 3 and 4. Overall we find that all included variables are
statistically significant with expected signs but also show that the variable that
measures occupied space is hardly or not significant. Panel B3 stands out with model
fit considerably below the other model specifications in both the long-run and the
short-run model. Changes in office employment, office demand and the asymmetry
measure are not significant for asymmetric model specification presented for cluster
B3 while they are for most other specifications.
Conclusion
In this paper we use an error correction model for understanding the changes in real
office rents for a panel of 15 U.S. MSA’s over the period 1990–2007. We find that
office rents react positively to a rise in office employment, lagged changes in office
rents and that there is only very slow error correction towards estimated equilibrium
rents. Given the non-negativity constraint of vacancy rates we extend the model by
examining whether rents react to changes in employment conditional on the vacancy
rate. Our results show that office rents react significantly stronger to increases in
employment when vacancy rates are below the long-term average. We relax the
assumption that all MSA’s exhibit the same reaction to changes in independent variables
by introducing results based on clustering. We base clusters on similarities in changes in
rent and office employment with multi dimensional scaling. Generally we find that there
are large differences in model fit across the clusters we examined but that there are only
small and insignificant differences in coefficients across clusters. We thus conclude that
the cluster results confirm the results found for the panel that includes all MSA’s.
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